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RECENT DECISIONS
creed an annulment when it was satisfied that other evidence existed.
The present case is not without precedent. It bears a striking
similarity to the decisions in actions for divorce which appear to
support the conclusion reached here. At an early date, the 105th
canon was applied to such actions.21 These decisions uniformly
recognize that the confessions of the parties are insufficient proof.22
They differ, however, in respect that they held the testimony of the
parties to the marriage to be admissible; corroboration thereof merely
being required to avoid collusion.23 It logically followed, therefore,
that a confession of adultery, when free from all taint of collusion,justified a decree of divorce.24 The theory was that when the reason
for the rule fails, the rule itself ceases.25 Still another interesting
comparison is presented by the cases requiring corroboration of the
testimony of private detectives and prostitutes.26 But again the court
refused to be bound by a rigid rule of evidence, and accordingly
determined the rule to be one for the guidance of the judicial con-
science.217
The resemblance between annulment and divorce cases can be
discerned more vividly, however, in the rationale of the decisions
which appear to leave to the court an area in which to exercise its
discretion; at once, flexible enough to provide bona fide petitioners
with the redress permitted by law, and yet, at the same time, sturdy
enough to protect the purpose for the requirement of corroboration.
The wisdom of a decision which leaves to the judiciary the function
of safeguarding public policy cannot be questioned.
APBITRATION-COmPETENCY OF AimITRAToRs.-During recent
years arbitration has been resorted to more and more for the settle-
ment of business controversies. With this increase there has been
betrothal . . . is eloquent corroborative evidence that ... he had no intention
to live with her.., in accordance with his promise... :'
2 1 See Betts v. Betts, 1 Johns. Ch. 197 (N. Y. 1814). When the canon was
embodied in statutory form no mention was made of its applicability to divorce
actions. N. Y. Ray. STAT., part II, c. VIII, tit. I, § 36. "No sentence of
nullity'... shall be pronounced .... "2 2 Fowler v. Fowler, 29 Misc. 670, 61 N. Y. Supp. 10 (1899) ; Mont-
gomery v. Montgomery, 3 Barb. Chi. 132 (N. Y. 1848); Betts v. Betts, 1
Johns. Ch. 197 (N. Y. 1814). 54( 86,Lo .~yn au23 Madge v. Madge, 42 Hun 524 (N. Y. 1886); Lyon v. Lyon, 62 Barb.
138 (N. Y. 1861); Doe v. Roe, 1 Johns. 25 (N. Y. 1799).
24 See note 23 supra.
25 Cf. Lyon v. Lyon, 62 Barb. 138, 142 (N. Y. 1861).26 McCarthy v. McCarthy, 143 N. Y. 235, 398 N. E. 288 (1894); Moller
v. Moller, 115 N. Y. 466, 22 N. E. 169 (1889); Platt v. Platt 5 Daly 295(N. Y. 1874).
27 Yates v. Yates, 211 N. Y. 163, 105 N. E. 195 (1914) ; Winston v. Winston,
165 N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273, aff'd, 189 U. S. 506 (1901). Cf. McKeon v.
Van Slyck, 223 N. Y. 392, 398, 119 N. E. 851, 852 (1918).
1951 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
a corresponding growth of judicial determinations concerning prin-
ciples of law applicable to arbitration. Recently, the First Depart-
ment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
spoke in two cases on the competency required of arbitrators.
In the first case plaintiff sued defendant for breach of a contract
made in 1947. Defendant moved for specific performance of an
arbitration provision in the contract. Plaintiff then moved to stay
the arbitration proceeding on the ground that defendant corporation
is beneficially owned by the Soviet government and that the arbi-
trator named in the contract, the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, is an instrumentality of the
Russian Government and thus an impartial arbitration could not be
had before such a body. Held, Plaintiff, having entered into an
agreement designating such Commission, was precluded from de-
claring his ignorance of the matter of common knowledge that the
Commission could not function in Russia, unless it were subject to
the Soviet Government's over-all control. The dissenting opinion
felt the appointment was void because of the relationship, but in
any event thought that plaintiff's knowledge of the relationship was
a question of fact. In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 277 App. Div.
531, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 747 (lst Dep't 1950).
In the second case, petitioner moved to vacate an award claiming
arbitrator's attorney was also attorney for one of the parties. Arbi-
trator denied he knew of this situation. There was also a question
whether the petitioner knew or should have known of the relation-
ship complained of before the arbitration was concluded. The lower
court denied the motion. Held, on appeal reversed. Considering all
of the circumstances, substantial issues were raised concerning the
knowledge of the arbitrator of the relationship of his attorney to the
submitted controversy and of the petitioner's prior knowledge of
this situation. Issues were referred to an official referee to report.
Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Goldsmith, 277 App. Div. 554, 100 N. Y. S.
2d 849 (1st Dep't 1950).
It may be said as a general rule that any disinterested person
may be selected to serve as an arbitrator.' Since the contract of
the parties determines the power of the arbitrators it seems that even
those under legal or other disability may be selected provided no
statute requires otherwise.2 There are general statements that
infants, the physically handicapped, committees of boards of trade
and unincorporated associations may act as arbitrators.3 But from
I ".... two or more persons may submit to the arbitration of one or more
arbitrators.. . ." N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1448.2 The New York statute contains no limitation. See N. Y. Civ. PRAc.
Acr § 1448. See Davis v. Rochester Can Co., 124 Misc. 123, 124, 207 N. Y.
Supp. 33, 34 (Munic. Ct. 1924), reV'd on other groiuzds, 220 App. Div. 487,
221 N. Y. Supp. 666 (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd zeithout opinion, 247 N. Y. 521,
161 N. E. 166 (1928). For statutory limitation, see MAss. ANN. LAws c.
251, § 16 (1933).
3 See Davis v. Rochester Can Co., 124 Misc. 123, 124, 207 N. Y. Supp.
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the nature of corporate powers which are defined and limited
by statute and articles of incorporation, it follows that the power to
act as an arbitrator cannot be conferred on a corporation or govern-
mental agency by mere consent of the parties.4
In most instances the parties voluntarily appoint the arbitrator
or arbitrators. 5 Notwithstanding this, they are chosen not as agents
of the parties 1 but to act in a quasi-judicial position in place of
their counterparts, the judges of the legal forum.T Thus, it can
readily be seen that an arbitrator's first essential requirement is a
judicial impartiality of such a nature that he can render an award
that gives each party equally and exactly what is due. Conversely,
anyone incapable because of partisanship or bias of rendering an
award that adequately sustains the notion of fair play is disqualified
from the office.8
A claim that an arbitrator's interest should cause him to be
ineligible or should cause the award to be set aside 9 must be cer-
tain and well-founded, that is, capable of demonstration and not in-
direct or conjectural.10 Consequently, a person is incompetent to
act as an arbitrator if he himself is a party to the dispute." Rela-
33, 34 (lunic. Ct. 1924), reu'd on other grounds, 220 App. Div. 487, 221 N. Y.
Supp. 666 (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd without opinion, 247 N. Y. 521, 161 N. E.
166 (1928).
4 Davis v. Rochester Can Co., 220 App. Div. 487, 221 N. Y. Supp. 666
(4th Dep't 1927) aff'd without opinion, 247 N. Y. 521, 161 N. E. 166 (1928).
5 Section 1452 of the New York Civil Practice Act provides for court
appointment of an arbitrator when the parties fail to provide for it or when
their own arrangement has not succeeded. Section 1453 of the same Act sets
forth the procedure for the appointment of an additional arbitrator. But,
unless the contract expressly states that an additional one shall be selected an
extra one cannot be named.
6 While an arbitrator is selected by one of the parties to the proceeding
he is not subject to the direction and control of the party nor to the general
principles of law with respect to agents.
7 There is a distinction between a referee or judge and an arbitrator.
Persons may be brought before a judge without their consent while parties may
voluntarily select their own arbitrators. A judge's authority springs from the
statute or constitution which created the court over which he presides. An
arbitrator exercises that jurisdiction granted to him by the contract of the
parties subject, of course, to express limitations found in the statutes. Ajudge's decision is subject to reversal on many more grounds than an arbi-
trator's award. See Note, Arbitration Proceedings Under Article 84, 24 ST.
JOHN's L. Rxv. 254 (1950).
B "Every litigant is not only entitled to present his claims to an impartialjudge, but to one who by no act on his part has justified a doubt as to his
impartiality." Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130, 135, 213 N. Y. Supp.
369, 374 (1st Dep't 1926).
9 ". . . the court must make an order vacating the award . . . 2. Where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or either of them."
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1462.
10 Davy v. Faw, 7 Cranch 171 (U. S. 1810); Brush v. Fisher, 70 Mich.
469, 38 N. W. 446 (1888).
1 See Supreme Council C.B.L. v. Grove, 176 Ind. 356, 96 N. E. 159, 161,
162 (1911).
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tionship by consanguinity,12 affinity's or business,' 4 i.e., servant, em-
ployee or agent, of debtor and creditor' 5 and attorney and client16
if unknown to the other party may cause disqualification. Of course,
any person who would derive benefit in any manner from the award
is included within the terms of this relationship restriction.'7
It should be noted, however, that while the relationships just
enumerated do not ipso facto make a person ineligible as a matter
of law, it will in most situations be enough to vacate the award if
unknown to the other party. The relationship is considered in con-
nection with other facts in deciding as a matter of fact whether he is
a prejudiced or impartial arbitrator.'8
On the other hand, most if not all causes to disqualify or vacate
are held to be waived in either of the following situations: (1)
where the complaining party having knowledge of the alleged cause
for disqualification submits his case without objection; (2) where
the complaining party learns the facts of disqualification subsequently
and does not promptly object to such arbitrator continuing; and
(3) where the complaining party knew or should have known of the
alleged disqualification when he agreed to the arbitrator at the time
the contract was executed.' 9
22 Pool v. Hennessy, 39 Iowa 192 (1874) (brother and business agent of
party choosing him).
13 Cf. Empire Plexiglass Corp. v. Levitt Corp., 192 Misc. 251, 77 N. Y. S.
2d 85 (Munic. Ct. 1948) (husband of law assistant to attorney for one of the
parties); Robb v. Brachtnan, 38 Ohio St. 423 (1882) (son-in-law, objection
waived however).14 American Guaranty Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F. 2d 209 (9th Cir. 1934) ; Matter
of Knickerbocker Textile Corp. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 172 Misc. 1015, 16
N. Y. S. 2d 985, (Sup. Ct. 1939) (arbitrator received notice of his designation
three days after president of other party to arbitration had decided another
arbitration proceeding in favor of company of which arbitrator was treasurer);
Pool v. Hennessy, 39 Iowa 192 (1874) (brother and business agent of party
choosing him). But cf. Matter of Meinig Co. v. Katakura & Co., Ltd., 241
App. Div. 406 272 N. Y. Supp. 735 (1st Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 266
N. Y. 418, 195 N. E. 134 (1934) (one of the arbitrators selected pursuant to
the rules of the Silk Association not disqualified because he was officer of
corporation which at times bought material from one of the parties) ; St. George
Textile Corp. v. Brookside Mills, Inc., 85 N. Y. S. 2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
(disqualification does not follow because arbitrator chosen by one of the parties
was president of a corporation which was a customer of another corporation
whose president was also the party's sales agent).
15 Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130, 213 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't
1926) (arbitrator by asking for and accepting loan from one of the parties
immediately became disqualified).(SUMatter of Albert v. Spiegelberg, 146 Misc. 811 262 N. Y. Supp. 795
(Sup. Ct. 1932) ; accord, Matter of Avalon Fabrics, 195 Misc. 267, 89 N. Y. S.
2d 166 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 275 App. Div. 1032, 92 N. Y. S. 2d
310 (1st Dep't 1949).
IT See Note, 104 A. L. R. 563 (1936).
1is Cf. National Fire Insurance Co. v. O'Bryan, 75 Ark. 198 87 S. W. 129
(1905); Matter of Newburger v. Rose, 228 App. Div. 526, 4O N. Y. Supp.
436 (Ist Dep't 1930).
19 Matter of Avalon Fabrics, 195 Misc. 267 89 N. Y. S. 2d 166 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd without opinion, 275 App. Div. 1032, 92 . Y. S. 2d 310 (1st Dep't 1949) ;
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It is by utilization of the above-mentioned rules of waiver that
the two reported cases find a basis for their decisions. The courts
are reluctant to interfere with an arbitration proceeding and will not
vacate an award unless there is shown a ground as set forth specific-
ally in Section 1462 of the New York Civil Practice Act.20 Moreover,
if none is forthcoming, the award is considered impregnable.2 1
Since arbitration has been accepted by businessmen as a practical
device to settle their mercantile differences, it is submitted that both
reported decisions are convincing and in accord with the purposes
of arbitration. The court, appreciating the real significance of ar-
bitration, refused to allow the plaintiff's claim of a legal technicality
in the Amtorg case. One of the many beneficent features of arbi-
tration is the settlement of controversies unencumbered by legal tech-
nicalities. On the other hand, while in the Amtorg case there was
no real question as to the plaintiff's prior knowledge of the conflict
of interest, in the Atlantic Rayon case it could not be said that an
issue of fact did not exist as to a waiver by the petitioner or partiality
of the arbitrator and therefore the court was correct in remanding
the case to determine the issues of fact involved.
From these two decisions it can be observed that while the courts
will take cognizance of the spirit of arbitration and thus help keep
it simple and free from the many technicalities which confront and
retard judicial litigation, it will insist in a proper case that the notion
of justice and fair play be adhered to in all arbitration proceedings.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-REVENUE LAW-ACTION ON TAx CLAIM
BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF ANOTHER STATE.-In an action by
a foreign municipal corporation to recover delinquent taxes against
the defendant as owner of personal property located in that foreign
municipality, a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction of the subject of the action was granted. The New York
courts as a matter of state policy do not lend themselves to the en-
forcement of the revenue laws of another state. Wayne County
[Michigan] v. American Steel Export Co., 277 App. Div. 585, 101
N. Y. S. 2d 522 (1st Dep't 1950).
That portion of the law commonly referred to as "Conflict of
Laws" or "Private International Law" determines whether in a par-
ticular legal situation the courts of the forum shall take cognizance of
ee Matter of Newburger v. Rose, 228 App. Div. 526, 528, 240 N. Y. Supp.
436, 438, 439 (lst Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 254 N. Y. 546, 173 N. E. 859(1930).
20 Goff and Sons, Inc. v. Rheinauer, 199 App. Div. 617, 192 N. Y. Supp. 92
(1st Dep't 1922).2 1 Pine Street Realty Co. v. Controulos, 233 App. Div. 404, 253 N. Y. Supp.
174 (lst Dep't 1931).
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